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Hurly-Berle—Corporate Governance, Commercial 
Profits, and Democratic Deficits 
Allan C. Hutchinson† 
“The Berle-Means corporation . . . is an adaptation, not a necessity.” 
-Mark Roe1 
The financial crisis over the last couple of years has exacted a 
heavy toll. Large corporations have gone to the wall, banks have needed 
to be bailed out, and whole national economies have collapsed. Amidst 
this mayhem, schemes of corporate governance have come under close 
scrutiny. Punishing inquiries have been made about their role and per-
formance in contributing to or failing to avert the crisis. As allegations of 
greed, incompetence, and irresponsibility by corporate bigwigs have ab-
ounded, many have asked whether the structures and processes of corpo-
rate governance have been equal to their supposed task of shaping and 
controlling corporate activities. Indeed, the debate about the validity of 
the whole approach to corporate governance has become an organiza-
tional bellwether in efforts to diagnose and remedy the ills of the finan-
cial crisis. 
In this Article, I want to make a distinctive contribution to that de-
bate. On the basis that no crisis should be wasted, I propose that substan-
tial and substantive changes are required in prevailing ways of thinking 
about and implementing corporate governance. Contrary to the views of 
many commentators, I maintain that it is the whole nature of what counts 
as “good corporate governance” that must be rethought and reconstructed 
from the conceptual ground up. In order to inform and accomplish this 
goal, I will move beyond the traditional evaluative focus of economic 
success and instead look to a more inclusive and democratic standard of 
social well-being. Drawing upon an expansive understanding of the role 
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of corporations in modern society and its recent crises, I will suggest 
ways in which the performance of corporations can be appreciated and 
assessed in terms of both economic and social improvement. The Article 
is based upon and devoted to offering a re-visioning of Berle and 
Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property.2 
Although Berle and Means’s work was intended to redirect the go-
vernance of corporate affairs away from furthering private cupidity and 
toward advancing public policy, their insights have done more harm than 
good; they have tended to reinforce the primacy of private cupidity or, 
perhaps more accurately, allowed subsequent theorists to prefer the pur-
suit of private cupidity by equating it with the development of public 
policy. This is not only unfortunate, but also unnecessary. Although 
Berle and Means’s The Modern Corporation forms the bedrock of the 
prevailing paradigm in corporate law and governance, it also contains 
some very suggestive materials from which to construct an alternative 
and more democratic way of proceeding that actually subverts and trans-
forms the established model. The remaining bulk of this Article seeks 
both to celebrate The Modern Corporation, but also to lament the endur-
ing influence of its received understanding on corporate law scholarship 
and practice. If The Modern Corporation is to avoid becoming “defunct” 
and remain relevant to contemporary ideas and practice, it must be more 
as a conceptual corrective and less as a traditional prop for the prevailing 
paradigm of corporate governance. 
The Article is divided into seven Parts. Part I discusses the role 
played by corporate governance during the current crises and why such 
governance fails to address the underlying causes. Part II sets out the 
context and general thrust of Berle and Means’s The Modern Corpora-
tion in 1932. Part III looks to the shifts in corporate history since 1932, 
and Part IV explores the basic inadequacy of the traditional Berle and 
Means paradigm of corporate governance. After offering a different and 
more democratic inspired reading of The Modern Corporation in Part V, 
there is an examination in Part VI of how it might be feasible to move 
from the present situation of corpocracy to a future milieu of democracy. 
Finally, Part VII lays out the main features of a democratic agenda for 
reforming corporate governance. Throughout the Article, the emphasis is 
on capturing the suggestive possibilities of a democratic approach rather 
than laying down a dogmatic program for changes in corporate gover-
nance models. 
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I. CRISIS AND GOVERNANCE 
Somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be a general level of consen-
sus about the primary causes of the present crisis. Although considerable 
disagreement exists about the important details of their precise dynamics 
and relative weighting, it is agreed that “short-termism” and “executive 
self-interest” played crucial and complementary roles in fueling the ex-
cessive risk-taking that was at the heart of the financial crisis.3 
First, management and boards became increasingly focused and, in 
some cases, fixated on inflating or maintaining a company’s share price 
in the short term without genuine or great concern for the long-term well-
being of the company. Operating without sufficient capital backing and 
relying on precarious lending, companies leveraged their limited assets 
without adequate regard for (il)liquidity constraints. All this was com-
pounded by the hands-off monetary policies and lax regulatory practices 
of governments. This was most apparent and devastating in the mortgage 
market, which—ballooned up by a toxic mix of imprudent initiatives, 
junk financing, predatory marketing, and regulatory indifference—
exploded to devastating effect. 
Second (and in combination with short-termism), the executive of-
ficers of corporations authorized and pursued enormously risky business 
projects in order to reap substantial profits, ramp up the company’s short-
term share price, and earn large bonuses and enhanced compensation for 
themselves. Although efforts to tie executive compensation to their com-
panies’ economic performance were originally intended to act as both an 
incentive and disciplinary device for management, it came to be revealed 
as a dangerous development that encouraged executives to take very 
risky gambles that had short-term benefits but exposed companies to 
substantial mid- to long-term costs.4 A smash-and-grab mentality began 
to take hold; the underlying fundamentals of the corporate condition 
were given short shrift. As the crisis vividly demonstrated, the apparently 
healthy state of the general economy and stock market in the first few 
years of the new century was revealed to be more the deceptive boom 
before the inevitable bust than anything else. 
The primary concern of this Article is not with the causes of the cri-
sis, but with the role that corporate governance played: Did corporate 
governance fail? And, if so, what can be done about it? Predictably, there 
is considerable disagreement. Some are not even persuaded that the fi-
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nancial crisis can be attributed at all to the prevailing schemes and ap-
proaches to corporate governance. For instance, Brian Cheffins insists 
that corporate governance functioned “tolerably well” in the largest 
American companies.5 In a survey of Standard & Poor’s top 500 compa-
nies, he claims to demonstrate that, in the thirty-seven companies re-
moved from Standard & Poor’s list, their schemes of corporate gover-
nance operated satisfactorily. Moreover, he contends that over 70% of 
the fifteen companies with the worst-performing stocks in 2008 did not 
have staggered boards, did not have a poison pill in place, and had ma-
jority voting or a director resignation policy. As such, Cheffins concludes 
that “the case in favor of dramatic reform [of current corporate gover-
nance arrangements] has yet to be made out.”6 He is still willing to place 
his faith in the lightly regulated disciplinary play of market forces. 
Although Cheffins’s survey and analysis are indeed cautionary, the 
conclusions that he draws are overstated and unreliable. He confirms the 
old adage that “if you ask the wrong question, then you will get the 
wrong answer.” Leaving aside the fact that market forces did more to 
facilitate the crisis than prevent it, there is simply too much taken for 
granted in his approach: the enabling role of the blinkered and overriding 
directorial fiduciary duty to enhance shareholder value is one villain of 
the legal piece. Asking if corporate governance was the, or even a 
“cause” of the crisis is plain silly. It is similar to asking if the lack of a 
safety device was the cause of an accident. A much more sensible in-
quiry is whether corporate governance, like a safety device, might have 
inhibited certain kinds of risky behavior or contained the calamitous ef-
fects of certain eventualities. Looked at in this light, it recommends a 
more attentive scrutiny of corporate governance’s capacity to check and 
channel the kind of short-term and excessive risk-taking that precipitated 
the crisis.7 
The more general response to these crisis-contributing features of 
contemporary corporate culture has been more positive and encouraging. 
Acknowledging that there has been “a widespread failure of corporate 
governance,” the U.S. Senate proposed a Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, 
which introduces measures to boost the long-term health and stability of 
firms and their shareholders.8 These include more transparent compensa-
tion practices, greater executive accountability, and enhanced risk man-
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agement. This has been supplemented by further legislative initiatives, 
which introduce tighter control over executive compensation by way of 
claw backs and greater shareholder say-on-pay, and which mandates im-
proved adviser independence and majority voting for directors.9 Of 
course, the impact of these measures will depend on the willingness of 
Congress and the Administration to enforce such requirements in a ro-
bust and consistent manner. 
These legislative measures are nothing to be sniffed at. Most of 
these reforms might well have a salutary effect on the attitudes and ac-
tions of corporate directors and executives. But they do not do nearly 
enough to address some of the deeper and continuing sources of corpo-
rate misgovernance. They still manage to operate and acquire validity 
within the traditional paradigm of corporate governance. Rather than 
simply place checks and balances on existing boards or transfer increased 
power to shareholders, a more root-and-branch restructuring of the dy-
namics and structures of corporate governance is needed. The size and 
consequences of the crisis demand a series of changes that are of the 
same extent and impact. If there is to be any real progress in averting 
future crises and putting corporate activity on a truly more stable footing, 
it will be necessary to go beyond the structural tinkering that characteriz-
es present reform efforts. 
For example, a 2009 study by David Erkens, Mingyi Hung, and Pe-
dro Matos points to the inadequacy of measures to make boards more 
accountable to shareholders and to increase the independence of 
boards.10 Examining the performance of 296 financial firms from 30 
countries that were at the center of the financial crisis, the authors reveal 
that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional owner-
ship experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period.11 They go 
on to suggest that the reasons for this result are twofold—because firms 
with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, 
which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period; and 
because firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital 
during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing sharehold-
ers to debt-holders.12 By way of conclusion, they cast doubt on whether 
regulatory changes that increase shareholder activism and improve moni-
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1224 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1219 
toring by outside directors will be effective enough in reducing the con-
sequences of future economic crises.13 
Accordingly, I maintain that the recent crisis has underscored the 
urgency of attending to the theoretical foundations of present and future 
practice. This is not only because of the scandals and calamities that have 
occurred, but also because of the enacted reform’s relative failure to ad-
dress the deeper sources of the crisis that face corporate governance: the 
diagnosed condition and the reputed cure are part of the same informing 
paradigm.14 Although theoretical posturing is considered indulgent by the 
tough-minded sensibilities of the corporate community (including, often, 
corporate law scholars), the current practice of corporate governance is 
in thrall to a very partial cluster of conceptual premises: “Practical men, 
who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influ-
ences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”15 The path-
breaking work of Berle and Means lies at the heart of this project: it is 
both part of the problem and part of the solution. 
II. 1932 AND ALL THAT 
The seventy-fifth anniversary of the 1932 publication of Adolf A. 
Berle and Gardiner C. Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property passed without too much notice. This classic work is universal-
ly acknowledged as one of law’s undisputed canonical texts. While it has 
aptly been described as “arguably the most influential book in U.S. busi-
ness history,”16 its importance is not merely as a historical curiosity; it 
has remained a mainstay of corporate law and scholarship up to the 
present day. While the book’s detailed analysis of corporate governance 
and the particulars of its reform proposals have become less important 
over time, it still exerts extensive conceptual influence. The fact that the 
book is no longer referenced as frequently is less an indication of its 
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dated quality and more a testament to its foundational status. Indeed, it 
would be no exaggeration to report that, as befits a book of its stature, 
The Modern Corporation continues to provide the general intellectual 
framework within which much traditional thinking about corporate go-
vernance in both law and business takes place. This is as true for the sta-
tus quo’s defenders as well as its detractors. Therefore, any serious effort 
to appreciate, let alone transform, the theory and practice of contempo-
rary corporate governance must pay close and critical attention to The 
Modern Corporation. 
Although Berle and Means’s work had a prescient quality to it, The 
Modern Corporation was very much a product of the 1920s. The first 
quarter of the twentieth century had witnessed a massive and rapid surge 
in America’s capital economy. Along with this rise in economic devel-
opment and prosperity, there was a shift in production from small busi-
nesses to huge conglomerates; the accumulation of vast fortunes and the 
concentration of corporate power in elite hands were hallmarks of the 
period. Culminating in the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great De-
pression, this era of unfettered capitalism was beginning to collapse un-
der its own burgeoning weight. By the late 1920s, the juggernaut of cor-
porate organization was being more closely scrutinized and its pervasive 
influence challenged. In what began as a research project for the Social 
Science Research Council of America, Columbia law professor Adolf A. 
Berle, Jr. sought out an economist with a statistical bent to work with to 
produce a more empirical and technical understanding of corporate de-
velopment; he was paired up with Gardiner C. Means. Their unusual col-
laboration sought to appreciate the corporation as a social institution as 
well as an economic organization. This huge undertaking was projected 
to be “the work of a lifetime,” and The Modern Corporation was to be 
the opening volume “intended primarily to break ground on the relation 
which corporations bear to property.”17 As such, it was meant to be the 
first and not the last word on the corporation as a human institution. 
Means’s extensive mapping of the contemporary corporate terrain 
was novel and revealing. In an examination of the 200 largest nonfinan-
cial corporations in 1929, he found that in only 11% of the firms did the 
largest owner hold a majority of the firm’s shares. Further, establishing 
ownership of 20% of the stock as a threshold minimum for control, it 
was discovered that 44% of those firms had no individual who owned 
that much of the stock. These 88 firms, which were classified as man-
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agement controlled, also accounted for 58% of the total assets held 
among the top 200 corporations. As analyzed by both Berle and Means, 
the upshot of these statistical insights was that there were two significant 
and pressing features to be addressed—the growing concentration of 
power within a relatively small number of large corporations and the in-
creasing dispersal of stock ownership resulting in a widening gulf be-
tween share ownership and executive control within those corporations. 
While each trend was important in itself, their combination persuaded 
Berle and Means that a corporate revolution had occurred and that a new 
frame of reference was required to appreciate it fully and deal with its 
legal and social ramifications. Although the fact of growing corporate 
power provided the informing backdrop, however, the major thrust of 
their report was the struggle to come to terms with the separation of 
ownership and control. Indeed, this characterization of the challenge be-
came “the master problem for research” in corporate law.18 The growing 
concentration of corporate power was more a contextual concern than a 
central problem, presumably to be explored more fully and directly in a 
later, but never realized, volume. 
In examining the organizational implications of the historical shift 
from family-owned firms to large, widely held corporations in which 
there was separation of ownership and control, Berle and Means contin-
ued, as they refined, a traditional view on corporate governance. They 
insisted quite straightforwardly that corporations ought to be run by the 
management whose powers were to be held in trust for stockholders as 
the sole beneficiaries of the corporate enterprise. As the separation be-
tween share ownership and managerial control was becoming increasing-
ly wide, they worried about “the concentration of economic power” 
creating “empires” that permit “a new form of absolutism” to be exer-
cised by “the new princes” and “economic autocrats” of controlling man-
agement.19 In an arresting phrase, they noted, “A Machiavelli writing 
today would have very little interest in princes, and every interest in the 
Standard Oil Company of Indiana.”20 Indeed, they were so concerned 
about the power of management that they compare the board of directors 
to “a communist committee of commissars” and cast the director as 
someone who “more nearly resembles the communist in mode of thought 
than he does the protagonist of private property.”21 In combating such 
                                                 
 18. Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923 
(1984). 
 19. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 116. 
 20. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, Corporations and the Public Investor, 20 AM. 
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disturbing consequences of the shift in corporate holdings, Berle and 
Means maintained that the primary role of corporate law was to ensure 
that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a cor-
poration, or to any group within the corporation, . . . are necessarily and 
at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the sharehold-
ers.”22 Because it is the liquidity of their property that most concerns 
shareholders, not their involvement in the corporation’s management, 
corporate law could rightly arrogate to itself the task of acting as general 
overseers of management and subscribe to the commitment that “a cor-
poration should be run for the benefit of its owners, the stockholders.”23 
For Berle and Means, therefore, the task was to work out how best 
to shape corporate law so that it could respond effectively and efficiently 
to the intricate and operational consequences of the divide between dif-
fuse owners and self-serving managers. Put more bluntly, their main fo-
cus was on ensuring that managers do not ignore the absentee owners 
and line their own pockets at the expense of the shareholders. Although 
retaining a continuing, if partial, faith in the market to discipline man-
agement and to protect shareholders’ expectations, they pinned their 
reform hopes on judicial intervention to discipline managers in the name 
of shareholder confidence. With varying degrees of success, this was to 
be achieved by mandating the primacy of shareholder voting in all-
important corporate decisions and the imposition of fiduciary duties on 
management (i.e., demanding that managers place the corporation’s in-
terests ahead of their own). In effect, they gambled on the willingness 
and suitability of courts to fashion and police a series of strict and equit-
able obligations such that “corporation law becomes in substance a 
branch of the law of trusts.”24 
The main legacy of The Modern Corporation, however, is Berle 
and Means’s framing of the ownership/control problem as the central 
dynamic of corporate law and organization. This remains the fundamen-
tal and taken-for-granted framework within which contemporary think-
ing occurs. But, notwithstanding the almost universal acceptance in the 
ensuing seventy-five years of the accuracy of their diagnosis of the ills 
that afflict corporate governance, their descriptive observations have not 
been matched by that of their prescriptive recommendations. While their 
reform proposals have seen some measure of success, they have not car-
ried the day; they are something of “a policy relic.”25 Incorporation of 
                                                 
 22. Id. at 220. 
 23. Id. at 293. 
 24. Id. at 242. 
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Berle and Means’s reform proposals into corporate law has been half-
hearted at best, and their capacity to restrain corporate malfeasance has 
clearly been lacking in practical effect. More recently, commentators 
have turned to the market by way of possible takeovers and performance-
based compensation as further modes of discipline such that inefficient 
managers would be replaced by profit-seeking shareholders. 
In large part, Berle and Means’s reform proposals relatively failed 
because they could not or would not move beyond the “private property” 
logic of the traditional paradigm; profit maximization and the protection 
of shareholders’ ownership entitlements were still the order of the day. 
Their support for governmental and judicial intervention was premised 
on the limitation that these official agencies would act as public surro-
gates for private shareholders’ control. In anointing managers as the 
“princes of industry”26 and recommending that they must serve the 
community as a whole by ordering their affairs “on the basis of public 
policy rather than private cupidity,”27 there was the distinct whiff of nob-
lesse oblige around even relatively liberal boardrooms in matters of cor-
porate governance. Indeed, with their commitment to the idea that share-
holders are “the owners of the corporation,” Berle and Means offer a la-
ment for the lost “active” shareholder who is left with “a mere symbol of 
ownership.”28 After all, the full title of their book is The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property. For them, a private property regime pro-
vides the best incentive to ensure that property is used efficiently in the 
sense that “the quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property 
to its effective use.”29 Accordingly, the central thrust of Berle and 
Means’s reform proposals was to close the gap between owners and 
management as much as the legal imposition of equitable duties can do 
so as to emulate or approximate the ideal situation of owner-managers. 
Theirs was less of a break with the tradition of “shareholder primacy” 
                                                                                                             
critics of the democratic process’s operation more generally. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
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 26. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 4. 
 27. Id. at 313. 
 28. Id. at 65. 
 29. Id. at 9. 
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and more of a continuance of it. There may well have been a “corporate 
revolution” by 1932, but Berle and Means were far from revolutionary in 
their response. 
III. CHRONICLE OF AN END FORETOLD 
Much has changed since 1932 in the world of capitalist economies 
and corporate organization. If the forces of “concentration” and “separa-
tion” were in play in Berle and Means’s day, they have been supple-
mented by others—institutional investors, takeovers and mergers, finan-
cial entrepreneurship, and the like—and become even more powerful and 
relentless today. Yet, if Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman were to 
be believed, the first few years of the twentieth century witnessed “the 
end of corporate history.” Echoing the apocalyptic pronouncements of 
Francis Fukuyama from a decade earlier, they declaimed in 2001 that 
“the basic law of corporate governance—indeed, most of corporate 
law—has achieved a high degree of . . . continuing convergence toward a 
single, standard model . . . [and t]here is no longer any serious competi-
tor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase 
long-term shareholder value.”30 
But how wrong they were! The crisis of 2008 turned over a fresh 
page in corporate history. It revealed that the “end of history” thesis was 
little more than wishful thinking by Hansmann and Kraakman. Their rea-
soned analysis was leavened by ideological advocacy. At best, it can be 
reported that the mainstream of corporate lawyers and commentators 
have settled on “shareholder primacy” as the preferred normative goal. 
This is less because it has achieved an objective and universal status, but 
more because few are prepared or have sufficient incentive to resist the 
economic and political clout of those championing its contemporary he-
gemony. It may well be a descriptive fact that “governance practice is 
                                                 
 30. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 439 (2001). No mention is made of Francis Fukuyama who (in)famously argued that the 
world had beaten a path to American liberal democracy on the unfolding carpet of a Universal Histo-
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tions” and “[a]t the end of history, there are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democ-
racy.” FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 139, 211 (1992). For a 
powerful critique of this viewpoint, see JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: THE STATE OF THE 
DEBT, THE WORK OF MOURNING, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 56, 69, 78 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 
1994) (1993). Even Fukuyama himself has had serious second thoughts about his original “end of 
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AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY, at xi (2006). 
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largely a matter of private ordering,”31 but that does not mean that it 
should be accepted as a prescriptive recommendation. Yet, even in the 
few years since 2001, events in the corporate world have not only con-
founded Hansmann and Kraakman’s optimism, but also have highlighted 
how fragile and defective the reliance on shareholder primacy has be-
come. 
Despite these end-of-history prognostications, the fact remains that 
Berle and Means’s account of the problem to be solved still informs most 
corporate law thinking. Almost all scholars and commentators are still in 
the grip of a traditional mind-set in which the interests of shareholders 
are paramount; shareholder primacy remains the guiding light of corpo-
rate law and scholarship. What has changed over the past seventy-five 
years, however, is that there have been varied and umpteen efforts to ex-
plain and rationalize this informing mandate so that it can have the larg-
est possible claim to normative legitimacy. Along with a continuing re-
liance on the “private property” rationale, there are three other dominant 
arguments relied on by contemporary theorists to explain and support the 
continued reliance on shareholder primacy as the preferred rationale for 
corporate law and governance; they are “market discipline,” “social 
wealth,” and “shareholder democracy.” Each of these arguments is deep-
ly flawed and unconvincing; there has been much heat, but little light. 
A. Property Ownership 
The defense of shareholder primacy that runs most directly from 
Berle and Means’s ideas is the claim that those who own the corporation 
are entitled to have the corporation operate in their interests and receive 
any resulting profits. While this defense still has its supporters, it has lost 
much of its argumentative appeal.32 The private property rationale mis-
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construes both the particular import of owning shares in a corporation 
and the general consequences of property ownership. While there can be 
little doubt that shareholders have property rights over shares, which can 
traditionally be treated as ownership, it does not mean that they, there-
fore, have similar ownership rights over the corporation. For instance, 
the fact that I buy a lottery ticket does not mean that I own part of the 
lottery corporation. While I do own the lottery ticket and have certain 
traditional property rights (e.g., to destroy it or give it to someone else), 
it does not mean that my relation to the lottery corporation is one of 
owner. While shareholders have various rights of “ownership” (e.g., to 
sell stock, vote proxies, sue directors, receive certain information, get 
residual payouts from a corporation’s liquidation), it is not convincing to 
assert that shareholders own the corporation in the same way that people 
own their cars or houses. Moreover, even if it is conceded that share-
holders are to be treated as “the owners of the corporation,” it by no 
means follows that they are entitled by virtue of that status to have the 
corporation run entirely in their sole interests. Whatever property owner-
ship was originally considered to entail, the claims of property owners 
are no longer envisaged or enforced as if they were unreserved and 
trumped all other competing claims and interests. The rights of property 
owners are fundamental, but not absolute.33 
The private property argument tends to beg the very question that it 
is intended to answer. In a democracy, private property has its important 
place, but it is not the foundational source of all other rights and no long-
er, if it ever was, the right against which all other claims are to be meas-
ured. Even when it comes to owning real property (e.g., a house or land) 
or personal property (e.g., cars or books), there is no entitlement that the 
owners’ interests and desires will always be given precedence over oth-
ers’ interests; there are a whole host of codes, regulations, rules, and 
conventions that curtail the freedom and entitlements of owners. Indeed, 
corporate law itself is chock-full of examples that contradict the stark 
idea that shareholders “own” the corporation—shareholders can be re-
stricted as to whom they sell their shares, how they vote for management, 
when they must offer to buy others’ shares, etc. Furthermore, in an econ-
omy of relatively diffuse shareholding, many shareholders are decidedly 
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passive by preference and have no interest in being involved in the man-
agement of the corporations in which they invest; the self-image of the 
average investor is not one of corporate owner. Accordingly, as in almost 
all other areas of law, corporate shareholding does not comprise a black-
and-white set of fixed entitlements, but is a very colorful, highly shaded, 
and dynamic process. It is now accepted that property ownership is a 
matter of social calculation in which individual interests are measured 
with and against other people’s interests.34 As the state creates and gives 
legal identity to corporations, it is for the state or the public to determine 
who gets ownership over it and what that ownership entails. As such, the 
ownership of a share will not convey any necessary rights on its owner 
nor will it necessarily amount to ownership of the corporation from 
which the shares arise. As with all property ownership, shareholding will 
consist of a bundle of rights whose content and extent will not be a natu-
ral given, but will vary over time and across contexts. 
B. Market Discipline 
The most sweeping defense of shareholder primacy comes from 
economics-inspired scholars. The world of corporate governance is con-
sidered to be an informal institutional venue for self-interested and moti-
vated entrepreneurs to enter a series of consensual deals to advance their 
own private economic interests. Although the market is far from being 
ideal or even optimal in its operations, it is touted as the preferred or 
least-worst alternative through which to coordinate productive endeavors 
and meet the mixed needs of its participants. From such a standpoint, the 
public regulation of corporate governance is considered to be merely fa-
cilitative rather than directive. Corporate actors are to be left to exercise 
their private discretion in determining what is best for particular corpora-
tions and, by virtue of that, the public interest: the market will fill the 
gaps and exact a penalty on the deviant few who engage in dubious ac-
tivities and unreasonable practices.35 This competitive market behavior is 
supposed to solve the separation of ownership and control by a variety of 
disciplinary devices—minimizing agency costs (i.e., keeping managers 
in line with shareholder interests), containing the ever-present threat of 
takeovers, responding to competition among firms for successful manag-
ers, monitoring share prices in the stock market, etc. Corporate law clear-
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ly favors the interests of shareholders over others because shareholders 
are more vulnerable as they are less able to find alternative outlets in the 
market for their services. They risk all their equity in the corporation’s 
ventures and therefore are entitled to greater protection by being benefi-
ciaries of the directors’ fiduciary duty over the fate of the corporation. 
The confidence placed in the capacity of market forces to fulfill 
these onerous responsibilities, however, seems extravagant and entirely 
suspect. The “great tragedy” of economics, like so many other academic 
disciplines, is that it is one more beautiful theory brought to its knees by 
ugly facts—it is reductionist in its insistence in viewing all social con-
duct in terms of market behavior; it manages, by giving everything a 
monetary value, to overvalue and undervalue much of human interaction; 
its leading concepts (voluntariness, transaction costs, etc.) are theoreti-
cally vague and practically indeterminate; it is ethically bankrupt in that 
it takes all personal preferences at face value and refuses to distinguish 
among them; it is self-serving in that it treats all personal preferences as 
independent of the social or market system in which they are generated 
and satisfied; it ignores the distinction between willingness to pay and 
ability to pay; and it celebrates individual autonomy over communal at-
tachment.36 
Any plausibility that the market can operate as a disciplinary tech-
nique through which to advance the larger public good is confounded by 
the sheer size and influence of today’s corporations. These massive insti-
tutions begin to serve their own interests at the expense of everyone 
else’s and distort rather than personify the entrepreneurial spirit of a 
market economy. Even Berle and Means accepted this, although they 
were not prepared to act fully upon it.37 Accordingly, although many 
scholars preach the gospel of free markets, the cruel irony is that corpo-
rations are one of the greatest threats to the operation of free markets: 
competition is attenuated and limited to a few large players. As such, 
corporations have become super-citizens with enormous powers and in-
fluence that rival those of the state and the latter-day church, but with 
much less popular legitimacy and social accountability. Rather than be 
the justificatory underwriter of corporate institutions and enterprise, the 
validating operation of today’s market is effectively hobbled by the con-
tinuing involvement of today’s mega-corporations. 
                                                 
 36. See Robert Ashford, The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law and Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1187, 1198 (2002). 
 37. See infra text accompanying notes 62–67. 
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C. Social Benefit 
A third justification for shareholder primacy is that it is the best 
way to ensure that corporate operations and profits work to the benefit of 
everyone in society: it is an “on a rising tide, all boats will rise” defense. 
Although it might appear paradoxical, it is argued that, even though in-
terests of shareholders deserve no greater weight in this social calculus 
than do the interests of any other members of society, there is “as a con-
sequence of both logic and experience, . . . convergence on a consensus 
that the best means to this end . . . is to make corporate managers strong-
ly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only 
to those interests.”38 In short, it is contended that the more wealth gener-
ated in a society, the better off or more satisfied the whole of society will 
be. By holding corporate powers in trust for shareholders, it will be the 
same as holding corporate powers in trust for the entire community: any 
efforts (and this is proportionately true for the efforts of corporations) 
that contribute to the increased wealth of a society are to be applauded. 
In short, maximizing profits and increasing share prices will not only 
benefit everyone, but also corporate profit-making and social service, far 
from being at odds with each other, can be understood as mutually rein-
forcing aspects of the same enterprise. 
Despite its ingenious nature, this “rising tide” defense of the desira-
bility of prioritizing the pursuit of corporate profits in the social scheme 
of things is as unconvincing on second look as it is on first glance: it is 
unsupported by “logic” and no evidence of “experience” is offered. 
There is surely no reason to accept at face value that, if a corporation 
declares profits of $1 million, social wealth is increased whether that 
profit is all distributed to one person, shared among the shareholders at 
large, spread among the various stakeholders, or distributed evenly 
across society. Economic growth will not in itself ensure that a society’s 
economic health, let alone its broader democratic or social health, is rude 
or improving. Indeed, many small boats are sinking or capsizing in this 
economic flow; their ability to stay afloat, let alone make progress, might 
well be in real danger. Accordingly, while a society’s overall economic 
growth is important and telling, it is not the sole or most important indi-
cator of a society’s general condition and improvement. That being the 
case, there is no self-evident reason to accept that an increase in its GDP 
is, without more, a consistent or convincing indication that a society is 
better off.39 Indeed, an increasing GDP may actually exacerbate social 
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divisions. While an increase might be better than a decrease, the circums-
tances of the increase or decrease and the distribution of those gains or 
losses will need to be measured against a broader and less exclusively 
economic standard. If some smaller or less sturdy boats sink before the 
increasing tide, then that is the price of progress. But this response seems 
crass, at best, because it is difficult to take satisfaction in society’s over-
all increased wealth if there are still people who live in relative poverty 
and destitution. 
D. Shareholder Democracy 
The final rationale for shareholder primacy is that it actually facili-
tates the achievement of democratic control over corporate activities and 
governance. The basic assertion is that, whatever the historical record 
suggests, the present distribution of shareholding is so diffuse and exten-
sive that large corporations are actually controlled by society at large. 
After all, more Americans own stock today than ever before, and the 
United States has one of the most widely held corporate economies in the 
world with only about 20% of corporations owned or controlled by a sin-
gle shareholder.40 This developing trend is reinforced by the increasing 
role of institutional shareholders, like mutual funds and pension funds, 
which enable ordinary investors to participate in corporate affairs and 
exert their aggregated influence in a more effective manner. Indeed, 
some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that plutocratic rule is 
at an end and that the age of “pension fund socialism” is now upon us.41 
But while these claims have some statistical credibility, their deeper 
significance is exaggerated. Although more Americans hold more stocks 
than ever before, their distribution is heavily skewed—the bottom three-
quarters of households own less than 15% of all stock, barely one-third 
hold more than $5,000 in stock, and almost a half own no stock at all.42 
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This is very soft ground on which to support the claim that “shareholder 
democracy” is alive and well. Not only does the unequal distribution of 
share ownership fatally impair such claims, but the fact that most of 
these investors remain passive also does little to bolster them. Indeed, the 
incidence of institutional investment has actually exacerbated the divide 
between ownership and control. Even greater power is concentrated in a 
small cadre of investing professionals who have enormous control over 
the market and seem intent on exercising it to align themselves closer to 
management so as to obtain further business and advance their own in-
terests. For instance, a recent study reveals that mutual funds have a de-
finite tendency to back executive pay proposals and to oppose sharehold-
er attempts to rein in such excesses: mutual funds support executive 
plans over shareholder opposition in almost three out of four instances.43 
Accordingly, while ensuring a more robust check on corporate manage-
ment’s self-serving tendencies is important, it does not address the 
broader concerns of corporate governance in a democratic society. Not 
surprisingly, the advancement of private interests has been the primary 
goal of institutional investors; the public interest has taken a distinct 
second place or has been reduced to much the same as the aggregate 
maximization of private interest. There is, at best, a faux democracy at 
work in contemporary corporate governance. 
IV. TOWARD A NEW AGE 
If there is to be an end to corporate history, it is not the one that 
Hansmann and Kraakman reported or predicted. To paraphrase Winston 
Churchill, the first decade of the twenty-first century is not the end of 
corporate history, but it might well be the end of one phase of corporate 
history and the beginning of another.44 Although we have entered the 
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third millennium, society’s most important and influential institution re-
mains decidedly Victorian, if not occasionally feudal, in its orientation 
and organization. A small, unrepresentative elite of controlling share-
holders, directors, and management effect a command-and-control regi-
men over the lives and fates of countless people. Yet, there are now some 
encouraging indications that there is a nascent shift in public opinion and 
forbearance. Not only are people beginning to lose patience with corpo-
rations, but there are also some emerging efforts to rein in their power. It 
is important to seize this moment of institutional disaffection and turn it 
to greater democratic and transformative effect. If a crisis exists, it is as 
much one of political will as it is of normative decrepitude. As the Italian 
philosopher Antonio Gramsci put it, “The crisis consists precisely in the 
fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum 
a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”45 Indeed, the past few years 
have witnessed “a great variety of morbid symptoms” in regard to corpo-
rate governance. 
The Enron saga, and particularly the institutional response to it, are 
probably most illustrative of this pathological condition. Indeed, the be-
leaguered company’s accounting scandals and the legislative response by 
way of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) are both decidedly deriv-
ative of and trapped within the paradigm of shareholder primacy; they 
present an indictment of the whole conceptual basis for corporate gover-
nance. As a reasonably stern response to shaken investor confidence in 
financial performance, SOX contains a series of measures intended to 
enhance corporate responsibility, improve financial disclosure, and com-
bat corporate and accounting fraud. To ensure more reliable processes of 
control, disclosure, and auditing of financial results, rules are directed to 
improving the efficiency of audit committees, the independence of out-
side auditors, the implementation of internal procedures, and the like. In 
particular, senior executives of large publicly traded corporations are 
required to validate the legitimacy of their performance reports by sign-
ing off on them. Most of these measures are mandatory in nature and 
impose monetary and criminal penalties for violations, although the pro-
visions about adopting a code of ethics for the CEO and senior financial 
officers only require that corporations disclose whether or not they have 
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such codes and, if not, why not. From within the shareholder-centered 
traditional paradigm, SOX is a relatively robust initiative and, as long as 
it is rigorously enforced, will have some important and beneficial effects. 
But while the legislative reforms might or might not improve audit-
ing and budgetary controls, there was a singular failure on the part of 
regulators to appreciate that it was the single-minded focus on maximiz-
ing shareholder value that was at the heart of the problem. SOX is pre-
mised on the idea that the whole Enron debacle was attributable to man-
agement’s conflicts of interest, which resulted from a lack of supervision 
by the board of directors.46 Consequently, the remedy was to be found in 
ensuring that executive behavior was brought back into line with and 
disciplined by greater solicitude for the interests of shareholders through 
a more independent board of directors and external auditors. But ample 
evidence exists that the corporation’s demise was fueled by the single-
minded and irresponsible efforts by the management and board to inflate 
and maintain share prices and stock values. A continuing attachment to 
shareholder primacy was as much the problem as the solution.47 Until 
that underlying commitment is confronted and met, there will be little 
progress in moving forward and avoiding further Enron-like debacles. 
While it might be going too far to suggest that traditional models of cor-
porate governance are priming large corporations to become accidents 
waiting to happen, it is entirely appropriate to recommend that there will 
be little progress in combating Enron-like failures until there is a shift 
away from the shareholder primacy ideology that continues to dominate 
the theory and practice of corporate governance. 
Accordingly, after a run of over 150 years, the basic model for cor-
porate regulation is in need of serious revision. The maladies that afflict 
corporate governance are no longer capable of being fixed by strong dos-
es of reformist medicine. The time has come to effect a complete rethink-
ing of our fundamental theories about and expectations of corporations in 
modern Western industrialized society. As in mid-nineteenth-century 
England, it is now imperative to bring about a massive transformation in 
the structure, organization, and outlook of large corporations. Up to the 
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1860s, there was the First Age of corporations in which they began life 
as state-sponsored enterprises to support the schemes and ambitions of 
fledgling nation-states in commerce and colonization. Between the 1860s 
and today, there has been the Second Age of corporations as private-
controlled agencies for wealth accumulation and technological innova-
tion. Giving birth to robber barons, corporate raiders, and dotcom billio-
naires, private corporations have become more global and only a little 
less exploitative in their operations as the state-directed agencies of old. 
There is now the need and, as importantly, the possibility for the emer-
gence of a new paradigm for the corporation. The move away from a 
private conception of corporate life to a more public vision of corpora-
tions need not be a misconceived return to the pre-1860 understanding of 
corporations as delegated centers of state power. The new age of corpo-
rations must be one in which these vital organizations are treated as vi-
brant and democracy-enhancing vehicles for public and private benefit. 
Within such a newly emerging sensibility and milieu, the power and 
prestige of corporations can be harnessed to the realization of a more 
democratic society generally. Indeed, precisely because corporations are 
so pervasive and so potent in their impact on most people’s daily lives, 
they offer a vital site at which to begin this paradigmatic overhaul. And 
the neglected subtheme of Berle and Means’s Modern Corporation is an 
excellent place to begin that important endeavor. 
V. BACK TO THE FUTURE 
It seems to be the fate of almost all canonical texts that they be-
come not only more cited than read, but also affixed with one received 
and uncontroversial meaning. Berle and Means’s classic monograph is 
wonderful proof of that tendency. If the great bulk of secondary literature 
is to be believed, The Modern Corporation comprises a series of second-
ary motifs around a primary theme—the need to bridge the gap between 
owners and management as much as the legal imposition of equitable 
duties can do so as to approximate the ideal situation of owner-managers. 
But that a particular text has been accepted into the legal canon does not 
mean that the light it casts is clear or certain. Indeed, as with texts that 
have received canonical status in literature or precedents as part of the 
doctrinal canon, the meaning and instruction of legal texts often remain 
much richer and more contested than appreciated or conceded; they do 
not speak for themselves, but their rereading is an occasion for valorized 
efforts at hermeneutical retrieval. For some, in law and literature, this 
richness and opacity are some of the qualities that recommend a text as 
great. In this sense, Shakespeare’s Hamlet and the Supreme Court’s 
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Roe48 are great not only because of their profundity, but also because of 
their profligacy.49 They have stood the test of time because of their rich-
ness and contestability, not in spite of them. Sadly, Berle and Means’s 
Modern Corporation has suffered a more orthodox fate. 
A. Re-vision 
Nevertheless, The Modern Corporation is not so easily pigeon-
holed and lends itself to convincing and suggestive alternative readings. 
Although it has been appropriated by mainstream corporate law academ-
ics to invoke the “separation of ownership and control”50 thesis to advo-
cate stronger shareholder rights, the text’s “analysis was a gun on a rotat-
ing platform that could be pointed in more than one direction.”51 Indeed, 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property is a profoundly challeng-
ing, yet schizophrenic book. It is, in large and traditionally understood 
part, a nostalgic lament for a lost and traditional age of simple economic 
arrangements; this rendering has become the mainstream legacy of Berle 
and Means. But, in smaller and neglected part, it is also a romantic 
yearning for a new and revolutionary vision of social organization. Once 
it is appreciated that “[s]ize alone tends to give these giant corporations a 
social significance not attached to the smaller units of private enterprise,” 
it is not so large a step to conclude that “[n]ew responsibilities towards 
the owners, the workers, the consumers, and the State thus rest upon the 
shoulders of those in control.” 52 
This alternative and more capacious reading comes alive when 
Berle and Means’s concern with the rise of the corporation as organiza-
tions that have “passed far beyond the realm of private enter-
prise . . . [and] have become more nearly social institutions”53 is placed 
front and center ahead of the ownership-and-control thesis. Indeed, in 
1932, they felt able to conclude The Modern Corporation with a chilling 
appraisal of American corporate power. They opined that not only did 
corporations represent “a concentration of economic power which can 
compete on equal terms with the modern state,” but also that “the mod-
ern corporation may be regarded not simply as one form of social organi-
zation but potentially (if not yet actually) as the dominant institution of 
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the modern world . . . possibly even superseding [the state].”54 If that day 
of “actually” has not yet arrived, it is perilously closer; the march of cor-
porate power has continued apace. To appreciate fully the extent to 
which corporations have consolidated and increased their economic 
sway, it is necessary to place their operations and performance in a wider 
global context. When this is done, the almost unrivaled dominance of 
these “non-Statist collectivisms”55 in social and political as well as eco-
nomic spheres can be grasped. 
If corporate sales and national GDPs are treated as interchangeable, 
corporations comprise about 50% of the world’s 100 largest economies. 
Of course, American corporations dominate the global group, with 82 
representatives in the top 200; Japanese firms are second, with only 41 
slots.56 So, General Motors is now bigger than Denmark; Daimler-
Chrysler is bigger than Poland; Royal Dutch/Shell is bigger than Vene-
zuela; IBM is bigger than Singapore; and Sony is bigger than Pakistan.57 
Indeed, the top 200 corporations’ combined sales are bigger than the 
combined economies of all countries, except for the biggest 10.58 Also, 
the top 200 corporations’ sales are growing at a faster rate than overall 
global economic activity.59 But while the sales of the top 200 corpora-
tions are the equivalent of 27.5% of world economic activity, they em-
ploy only 0.78% of the world’s workforce.60 Furthermore, although those 
corporations’ profits grew 362.4% in the past twenty years, the number 
of people that they employ has increased by only 14.4%.61 The economic 
clout of the top 200 corporations is particularly staggering compared to 
that of the poorest segment of the world’s humanity: their combined 
sales are eighteen times the combined annual income of the 1.2 billion 
people, or 24% of the world’s total population, living in “severe” poverty 
(those surviving on less than $1 per day).62 
Once what Louis Brandeis termed the “curse of bigness” is placed 
in contemporary context,63 the concerns of Berle and Means become 
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even more compelling. They appreciated that, because “[t]he economic 
power in the hands of the few persons who control a giant corporation is 
a tremendous force which can harm or benefit a multitude of individuals, 
affect whole districts, shift the currents of trade, bring ruin to one com-
munity and prosperity to another,”64 the people who exercised power 
over these burgeoning corporate empires would become the new “princes 
of industry”65 and a new despotism would take hold. As such, it was es-
sential that this enormous power “shall be subjected to the same tests of 
public benefit which have been applied in their turn to power otherwise 
located” in modern society.66 In short, therefore, if “accountability” is 
seen as the primary theme of the book, its concerns and proposals for 
change take on a very different emphasis and orientation. The private 
property owners became as much a part of the problem as the solution; 
their powers and entitlements must be harnessed to and disciplined ac-
cording to the public interest. When read in this way (and almost despite 
the efforts of the authors themselves), The Modern Corporation remains 
a robust and still relevant critique of corporate governance at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century. More importantly, it still resonates 
strongly as a rallying call to populist arms—for all those who are com-
mitted to making the large modern corporation a worthy and welcome 
participant in the all-important project for democratic empowerment. 
B. Second Thoughts? 
In many ways, it was Berle and Means’s own ambivalence about 
pursuing the more radical implications of their critique that hindered ef-
forts to move away from a private property regime to a more fully public 
re-envisioning of the corporate role and responsibility. At the end of their 
celebrated monograph, they begin to build on the established fact that the 
modern-day shareholder has clearly “surrendered a set of definite rights 
for a set of indefinite expectations.”67 Indeed, they go so far as to con-
cede that, with the entrenched separation of ownership and control, the 
shareholders’ “relation to [their] wealth” has changed and that the corpo-
ration should be seen as a public entity and “the logic applicable to that 
change should itself change.”68 Yet Berle and Means refused to take the 
next logical step, which was not only to accept the passivity of share-
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holders, but also to recognize that the very idea of the shareholder as 
property owner was no longer valid or applicable, and that reliance on a 
private property rationale for corporate governance was no longer com-
pelling or desirable. 
Even at its publication in 1932, The Modern Corporation’s focus 
on the importance of the disjuncture between ownership and control did 
not persuade everyone. Dissenting voices could be heard, although their 
force and caution have long since been ignored. In particular, E. Merrick 
Dodd Jr. argued that corporate directors and officers should not be 
viewed solely as agents of shareholders, but should also be required to 
act as stewards for the interests of others, even if that meant curtailing 
the proprietary rights of those shareholders. Indeed, Dodd went so far as 
to suggest that managers might go further and actually consider them-
selves to be “guardians of all the interests which the corporation affects 
and not merely servants of its absentee owners.”69 Berle took up the chal-
lenge and responded to Dodd by arguing that a broad corporate duty to 
serve society would not only violate shareholders’ private property 
rights, but also be so vague as to put no meaningful constraint on manag-
ers’ use of corporate assets: “Unchecked by present legal balances, a so-
cial-economic absolutism of corporate administrators, even if benevo-
lent, might be unsafe . . . .”70 But by the late 1950s, a chastened Berle 
seemed to have at least conceded considerable ground in his debate with 
Dodd. While he recognized that managerial discretion might be viewed 
as a positive attribute that could allow managers to act in the interests of 
society as a whole,71 Professor Berle insisted that he did not accept that 
Dodd was right in any absolute or prescriptive sense: “It is one thing to 
agree that this is how social fact and judicial decisions turned out. It is 
another to admit this was the ‘right’ disposition; I am not convinced it 
was.”72 
By 1968, in their new and separate prefaces for The Modern Corpo-
ration, Berle and Means had begun to accept many of the limitations in 
the thinking that underlay the original edition. Nevertheless, they were 
still not fully prepared to abandon their established ways of thinking. 
After describing the even greater level of concentration and lack of ge-
nuine competition among American corporations, the economist Means 
contented himself with simply asking, “Is the concentration of power in 
                                                 
 69. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145, 1157 (1932). 
 70. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365, 1372 (1932). 
 71. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 107–10 (1959). 
 72. Berle, supra note 55, at xii. 
1244 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1219 
the managements of the large corporations consistent with the mainten-
ance of a democratic society?”73 On the other hand, the law professor 
Berle stated that, while the nature of the property rights of shareholders 
has changed, there is still very much a property right at work. Although 
“a new classification has been superimposed on the old theory”74 and 
“the ‘private’ and, still more, individualized, aspects [of property] will 
become increasingly attenuated,”75 there has now been a break-up of “the 
package of rights and privileges comprising the old conception of proper-
ty.”76 Nevertheless, Berle came back to the conclusion that, even though 
there has been a move away from treating stock as primarily a vehicle for 
raising capital and more “a channel for distributing income whose accu-
mulation for capital purposes is not required,”77 the modern corporation 
and “property used in production [i.e., shares] must conform to concep-
tions of civilization worked out through democratic processes of Ameri-
can constitutional government.”78 He was convinced that the era of pri-
vate corporations (or, at least, the understanding of corporations as ex-
tensions of private shareholding) was no longer coherent in practice or 
theory. 
The time has come, however, to take the obvious steps that Berle 
and Means illuminated but felt unable or unwilling to pursue themselves. 
In a compelling conclusion to The Modern Corporation, they floated the 
idea of rejecting both a strengthening of the rights of passive investors 
and a realpolitik acceptance of managerial control. Instead, they offered 
the possibility that, because existing corporate arrangements had “cleared 
the way for the claims of a group far wider than either the owners or the 
control [group],” the community could “demand that the modern corpo-
ration serve not [only] the owners or the control [group] but [also] all 
society” and that the governing principle of corporate governance should 
be “the paramount interests of the community.”79 Indeed, Berle and 
Means end with a hope that the separation between ownership and con-
trol will result not in a triumph by one faction over the other, but with the 
rise of a new paradigm of corporate governance: “The law of corpora-
tions . . . might well be considered as a potential constitutional law for 
the new economic state . . . .”80 While they were wrong in believing that 
the control of corporations and the balancing of interests might be af-
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fected, as in “brought about by” “a purely neutral technocracy,” they 
were on the right track when they expressed the hope that this might be 
done “on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.”81 The 
challenge, therefore, is to move from “private cupidity” to “public poli-
cy” while both retaining the best of private initiative and resisting the 
worst of a domineering state. This can be achieved by ushering in a new 
era of corporate history in which democracy is the standard and the goal 
of corporate governance. In such a vision, corporations might begin to 
function as a democratic nexus at which public and private, political and 
economic, individual and state, and personal freedom and civic responsi-
bility meet. Corporations will be less an anomaly in contemporary demo-
cratic terms and more a primary site for the advancement of democratic 
politics. 
Before proceeding to sketch this democratic alternative, two prelim-
inary caveats are worth mentioning. As critical as I am of the narrow 
scope and shallow substance of the existing model of corporate gover-
nance, none of my critique should be interpreted as trashing or rejecting 
those legal rules and doctrines which seek to control management in the 
name of some larger set of interests; no other group gains when manag-
ers self-deal. But in supporting such disciplinary laws, it does not follow 
that the effort to discipline management should be done only on behalf of 
shareholders. From a more democratic perspective, profit maximization 
will not be eschewed entirely, but will simply no longer be the exclusive 
or predominant goal among many other social ambitions—shareholders 
will be one kind of constituency member. Moreover, in recommending a 
shift away from the present paradigm, I am not suggesting that the whole 
idea of private property should be abandoned or, as some might propose, 
that the means of production be put in public hands. I am as much 
against an overbearing state as a rampant private sphere. It is more that 
democracy should be used as a theory and a practice to address the eco-
nomic and social conditions of people’s lives as much as their civil and 
political entitlements. The market must be made to serve, not control 
people’s interests. In that, Milton Friedman is right in one important re-
gard—the effort to extend the range of institutions and interests to which 
corporations owe obligations is a “fundamentally subversive doctrine.”82 
But while this effort might signal the end of the prevailing governance 
arrangements, it might also be the harbinger of a more democratic socie-
ty. 
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VI. FROM CORPOCRACY TO DEMOCRACY 
In seeking to nurture and develop suitable forums and settings that 
are more local and less hierarchical, and are more participatory and less 
private, large corporations recommend themselves as almost ideal loca-
tions for enabling people to become full citizens in their society. They 
stand squarely between the market and the government, and they exert 
the kind of power that needs to be opened up if there is to be any real 
progress in closing the democratic gap between the governors and go-
verned. Of course, such a political enterprise will demand that several 
crucial relations and contexts be transformed and reworked—those be-
tween corporations and the state; those inside corporations (i.e., between 
shareholders, management, and workers); and those between corpora-
tions and the general public. Nevertheless, it is only if such a bold strate-
gy to advance the democratic project is commenced that any real or mea-
ningful change in the democratic condition generally, and in corporate 
governance particularly, can be expected. There are risks attached to 
such a commitment, but there are greater dangers to maintaining the sta-
tus quo. 
A. A Democratic Gambit 
In the quarter century since Lindblom’s conclusion that “the large 
private corporation [does not fit] into democratic theory and vision,”83 
the situation has hardly improved. Although the power and influence of 
corporate activities has continued to expand and deepen, a democratical-
ly inspired agenda for corporate governance has lost much of the plot. 
Reform efforts remain too reactive, too piecemeal, too modest, and too 
trapped within the prevailing paradigm. In contrast, I want to offer, in the 
spirit of a reworked Berle and Means approach, an unabashedly and ro-
bust democratic proposal for corporate law and governance. By under-
standing corporations as neither wholly public nor wholly private institu-
tions, the hope is to move beyond the cramped language of the public–
private and harness the traditional strengths of the corporate form to the 
more civic agenda of democracy. By envisaging and concretizing a dem-
ocratic form of corporate organization, it might become possible to culti-
vate the kind of hybrid institution for civic interaction, both economic 
and political, which will be true to the democratic ambitions of all its 
participants. 
Despite all the recent and high-profile shenanigans of bad corporate 
behavior, it would be mistaken to place all the critical focus on them. If 
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any actual progress is to be made in confronting and improving corporate 
wrongdoing, it demands more than an ethical and criminal condemnation 
of such individual conduct. As important as that is, identifying and pu-
nishing corrupt or greedy executives whose conduct is castigated by al-
most everyone both outside and inside the corporate world is the easy 
part. What is much more difficult and necessary is to address the larger 
organizational structures and culture within which such roguery arises 
and persists. It is what presently passes as “good corporate governance” 
that is as much of a problem as the instances of bad corporate behavior. 
It might be that when corporate managers are doing their jobs best, or at 
least well, they are doing most harm to society. This perverse state of 
affairs demands urgent appraisal. It is only when large corporations are 
understood and analyzed in the larger setting of democracy that it will be 
possible to move forward. Indeed, it is only when corporations are ob-
liged to become part of, rather than remain apart from, democratic socie-
ty more broadly that progress will be made. If we want “good corporate 
citizens,” then we must seek a sea-change in how we think about corpo-
rations, how we constitute them, how we regulate them, and what we 
expect of them. To ignore or marginalize such issues is to renege on the 
most basic of democratic ambitions. 
The fact that large corporations are major players in the political, 
economic, and social system seems to be indisputable; they exercise 
enormous power over the lives of ordinary people. While any accumula-
tion of power must be treated with suspicion and mistrust in a democra-
cy, there is no need to consider it illegitimate by its aggregation alone. 
Power is not the problem in and of itself, but the basis for its exercise and 
legitimacy. When it comes to the pedigree and consequences of corpo-
rate power, there is a considerable burden on its operatives and apolo-
gists to offer a suitable series of justifications; corporate power seems 
presumptively undemocratic, if not actually anti-democratic. Because the 
goal of shareholder primacy has become “second nature . . . to politi-
cians,”84 it will be necessary to offer a pragmatic alternative to the neoli-
beral philosophy that has proven so effective in insulating large corpora-
tions from regulation and regeneration in the public interest. As the line 
between government and business has become increasingly blurred, poli-
ticians are persuaded that government’s only legitimate role is to facili-
tate business. As one critic pointedly notes, “While the business of gov-
ernment seems more than ever to be business, the business of busi-
ness . . . [is] increasingly becoming that of government . . . .”85 
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Despite its many different and innovative efforts, traditional theo-
rizing has failed to make a persuasive case for how the modern corpora-
tion can be reconciled with the rhetoric and reality of democratic gover-
nance in contemporary society. In particular, a major source of bewitch-
ment in this process is the conceptual tendency to insist that there is an 
almost cast-iron distinction between public undertakings and private in-
terests. Whereas the former are considered to be the legitimate domain 
for democratic participation, the latter are treated as something aside 
from that. In this formalized approach, emphasis is placed on the source 
and pedigree of power rather than its effects and consequences. In a 
world of enormous corporate power and influence, such a disciplinary 
device is almost guaranteed to ignore and even condone extensive abuses 
of power. It guts the whole emancipatory dynamic of accountability and 
makes democracy safe for the private exercise of corporate power. In 
short, large corporations are the favored offspring of neoliberalism’s at-
tachment to the public–private distinction.86 
B. Beyond Public and Private 
Yet, when viewed from a thoroughly democratic perspective, the 
operations and decision-making of the modern corporation cannot be 
immune from public oversight in the public interest. It is the “abuse of 
power” in substantive and real terms that is the focus of attention. The 
formal source of power is secondary to its effects and deprivations. Re-
liance on a strict public–private distinction exacerbates the pernicious 
effects of privatized corporate power on people’s lives. Of course, it does 
not follow that, when understood as “the dominant institution of the 
modern world,”87 corporations are to be treated in the same way as other 
large-scale public institutions by having the full panoply of duties and 
responsibilities under the administrative or even constitutional law re-
gime imposed on them by the courts. This is to misunderstand both the 
nuanced and pluralistic insights of democratic governance and the struc-
tural and democratic limitations of judicial review. Although it is impor-
tant to appreciate large corporations as remote and bureaucratic institu-
tions and to emulate the participatory ambitions of modern administra-
tive law, it is both unwise and impractical to aggregate even further pow-
er in the courts; their own democratic legitimacy is sufficiently fragile 
and contested to caution against an extension of judicial review’s exist-
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ing reach.88 Instead, a different and more substantive set of measures 
must be introduced that can grapple more directly and effectively with 
the substantive and formal dimensions of what counts as good corporate 
governance. If corporations can be made to function as a democratic 
nexus at which public and private, political and economic, individual and 
state, and personal freedom and civic responsibility meet, they will be-
come less an anomaly in contemporary democratic terms and more a 
primary site for the advancement of democratic politics. 
At the heart of a democratic compact will be a reinvigoration of the 
neglected fact that the corporate form is a distinctly public institution that 
is brought into existence by the state and has certain conditional powers 
delegated to it by the state. As constructions and emanations of the state, 
modern corporations have a distinctly public origin and a decidedly pub-
lic purpose.89 The debate about corporate governance is, therefore, about 
the nature and parameters of those public purposes. Once corporations 
are understood in this way, it no longer continues to be a question of 
whether it is appropriate or reasonable to ask corporate owners and ad-
ministrators to pursue the public interest at all. Instead, the more telling 
issue is what public interests should the corporation pursue and how it 
should go about formulating and operationalizing them. The advance-
ment of private interests will remain important, but will not exhaust the 
public interest. By availing themselves of the advantages of incorpora-
tion, investors and entrepreneurs are entering into a bargain with the state 
and the community—in return for the benefits of pursuing their private 
ambitions through the corporate form, people must accept the public re-
sponsibilities and costs that come with it. Shareholders and stakeholders 
would become simply different kinds of members who would include 
owners, directors, managers, workers, customers, suppliers, lenders, 
neighbors, community, etc. 
VII. A DEMOCRATIC AGENDA 
There will be nothing easy about determining for the purposes of 
corporate governance which groups are to classify as members, by what 
means their interests are to be ascertained, how to ensure that those inter-
ests are adequately represented, and on what basis those often competing 
interests are to be weighed and balanced. But a commitment to democra-
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cy demands that such efforts be made.90 While a variety of strategies lend 
themselves to this emancipatory project, I will concentrate on four par-
ticular initiatives—limits on limited liability; a broadening of directors’ 
fiduciary duties; the increased representativeness of the board; and the 
enactment of substantive regulatory standards. While each of these inno-
vations are not novel in themselves, they will, when taken together as a 
package, help to bring about a genuine and thoroughgoing change in the 
democratic thrust of corporate governance. 
A. Limited Liability 
Although the limited liability of corporations is considered one of 
the main attractions of incorporation, as it encourages investment at less 
risk and with greater diversification, it has some severe shortcomings. 
Specifically, it tends to reallocate risk rather than reduce it; it places this 
reallocated risk on those stakeholders (e.g., employees, neighbors, etc.) 
often less able to shoulder it; and it can encourage riskier behavior as 
corporations are excused from internalizing the full costs of their risk-
taking.91 To make democratic sense of this debate, however, it is neces-
sary to keep a broader and more encompassing view of corporate activi-
ty. After all, as I have been at pains to emphasize, the whole notion of 
“governance” implies much more than simply doing profitable business; 
it suggests a public and accountable aspect to the dealings of the corpora-
tion that encompasses, but is not only reducible to, private gain and eco-
nomic profitability. When understood from a democratic perspective, it 
is the limits of limited liability rather than limited liability itself that must 
be reconfigured. 
Under such a democratic conception of corporate governance, it 
seems entirely unconvincing to establish an institutional framework for 
legal liability that shifts almost all the costs onto some persons and all 
the benefits onto others. At the moment, on the one hand, there is man-
agement/shareholder control without responsibility and, on the other 
hand, there is stakeholder responsibility without control. This is anathe-
ma to the democrat who is committed to closing, not maintaining, the 
gap between the powerful and the less powerful. If people claim the 
rights of ownership and the authority to govern the corporation in their 
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own best interests, it seems almost axiomatic that they should at least 
bear some responsibility for its actions and behavior. That said, if the 
shareholders’ lack of responsibility is to continue to any extent, then 
there seems no compelling reason to object to the reduced control of 
shareholders or their displaced focus as the corporation’s main concern. 
From a democratic perspective, the price of limited liability is the cost of 
reduced influence. While there are also other legal mechanisms by which 
to reduce negative externalities created by corporate conduct (i.e., gener-
al welfare laws designed to deter corporate conduct through criminal and 
civil sanctions), the imposition of some liability in some circumstances 
on shareholders seems democratically optimal.92 
Rather than take an all-or-nothing stance, it is better to provide a se-
ries of initiatives that can be combined to affect the limited and selective 
availability of limited liability. Possible legal strategies for limiting li-
mited liability include narrowing its scope to contractual risk as opposed 
to tort liability, introducing pro rata liability for shareholders,93 lifting 
the corporate veil more, imposing selective liability on controlling share-
holders, abolishing limited liability for shareholding corporations, and 
greater vicarious liability of directors in certain circumstances.94 Each 
has the distinct potential to affect a more acceptable balance of control 
and risk; traces of each approach can already be detected in corporate 
law. But, when understood as part of an integrated and democratic ap-
proach to corporate governance, they can work together to provide a 
more subtle, balanced, and measured solution. 
B. Extended Duties 
The next step in transforming the modern corporation into a more 
democratic and more public-oriented institution is to take seriously the 
assertion that the board of directors must exercise their powers and fulfill 
their fiduciary duties “in the best interests of the corporation.” In defin-
ing which interests best comprise the corporation, it will be necessary to 
take a more expansive view than the limited focus on the interests of one 
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set of stakeholders, namely the shareholders. Such interests are entirely 
deserving of consideration, but they will be only one set of interests to be 
taken into the balance and not the exclusive or primary ones. The ghost 
of Dodge must be exorcized once and for all.95 The corporation is an or-
ganic entity with multiple and shifting constituents whose interests will 
vary over time and in different contexts; no one set of interests will have 
its thumb on the governance scales. In advancing the welfare of the cor-
poration, it will be important to assess the directors’ performance over an 
extended time frame rather than on a single-decision basis; the best inter-
ests of the corporation will not be reducible to a simple formula or set of 
fixed interests. This will be a challenging undertaking for directors and 
one that will demand a variety of skills and sensitivities. Traditional crit-
ics will be right to point out that such general obligations will not easily 
be rendered operational, instilled with specific substance, or given effec-
tive teeth; this broad responsibility can become a shield to justify any 
action by the board. As Berle himself observed, “[U]nchecked by present 
legal balances, a social-economic absolutism of corporate administrators, 
even if benevolent, might be unsafe.”96 These are reasonable objections 
but insufficiently compelling to derail the whole project. 
As things presently stand, the directors must often balance the 
competing interests of different shareholders in a constantly shifting 
market—are long-, medium-, or short-term interests of the shareholders 
to be served? Are directors to concentrate on increasing production and 
dividends or managing the share price? How is equity to be ensured 
among majority and minority interests? These are far from easy ques-
tions and require considerable sophisticated judgment by the directors. 
Of course, extending the directors’ fiduciary duty to stakeholders will not 
lessen that challenge. But it also will not move it into a qualitatively dif-
ferent realm of operational difficulty. There are already several fiduciary 
relationships imposed by law (e.g., executors) that encompass duties to a 
class of persons or groups whose interests might well be far from unitary 
or readily compatible. Consequently, while demanding and difficult, the 
application of a broader fiduciary duty is certainly not outside the com-
petence of sophisticated businesspersons. Rather than be an exceptional 
duty, the fiduciary responsibility of directors would be brought in line 
with the thematic principle that fiduciaries are to be held “to something 
stricter than the morals of the marketplace. . . . Only thus has the level of 
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by 
                                                 
 95. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 96. Berle, supra note 70, at 1372; see also 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND 
LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 82 (1979). 
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the crowd.”97 In the campaign to democratize the corporation, this seems 
an essential and welcome reform. 
C. Representative Boards 
Corporate duties to stakeholders are an improvement, but they are 
not a lasting or substantial solution, and their effects will be muted. Un-
less there is a change in the composition of those entrusted with the pow-
er and responsibility to run the corporation, it will always be what man-
agers or shareholder-appointed directors think is in the best interests of 
the broader stakeholder community rather than stakeholders being able to 
determine that for themselves. After all, democracy is not only supposed 
to be for the people, but of the people. No matter how benign or progres-
sive the decisions made by elite groups may be, they remain decisions 
that lack the important imprimatur of democratic participation: accounta-
bility is only a poor second to participation as a mode of democratic go-
vernance. As with other institutions and agencies charged with advancing 
the public interest, there is a compelling need for public participation. 
Accordingly, as well as reforming the rules for proxy voting, strenuous 
efforts must be made to introduce reforms that will facilitate involvement 
by those stakeholder groups whose interests are directly and substantially 
at stake in corporate behavior. 
Because the potential effects of large-scale corporate activities are 
truly wide-ranging and often global, however, this challenge is beset by 
practical difficulties. The two main initiatives to date for dealing with 
this conundrum are “diversified shareholding” and “independent direc-
tors.” While they both make important inroads into present arrange-
ments, they fall short of any truly democratic goal. Whereas independent 
directors are themselves appointed by and are often beholden to the ex-
isting shareholder-appointed board, diversified shareholding tends to 
reinforce the existing scheme of corporate governance by perpetuating 
the idea that financial contribution is the best measure of democratic par-
ticipation.98 When employees become shareholders, the real threat is that 
they become persuaded to adopt the same purely economic mentality to 
corporate planning and success as today’s shareholders; they will be 
more interested in short-term gains in the secondary stock market than in 
long-term contributions to the primary goods-and-services and jobs mar-
kets. 
                                                 
 97. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
 98. Also, apart from the dangers of cooptation, employees might actually become more vulner-
able because, if the corporation gets into serious problems, they will stand to lose not only their jobs 
but also their savings. See KIM MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD: UNIONS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 93–108 (1997). 
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A more convincing avenue of democratic reform would be to intro-
duce independence and diversification in a more direct manner. For in-
stance, it might be possible to divide affected persons and stakeholders 
into three main constituencies. Each constituency would represent and 
give increased involvement to different members of the corporate com-
munity. The three constituencies would be the shareholders, the em-
ployees, and the other stakeholders or the public. As regards the share-
holder constituency, all shareholders might have the same entitlements 
and responsibilities with no one shareholder being able to exercise more 
than 25% of the overall total of votes available to shareholders. When it 
came to the employees, all existing and permanent employees, part-time 
and full-time as well as management and rank-and-file, would be eligible 
to vote for a third of the board; those who stood for election as em-
ployee-representatives would themselves have to be employees. Finally, 
as regards the public constituency (which would include all other stake-
holders, such as creditors, suppliers, customers, local community, etc.), 
there might be an attempt to designate a third of the board as “general 
public directors” whose mandate would be to represent the public interest 
as it applies to the operations of a particular corporation. These directors 
could be selected by a two-thirds vote of the rest of the already-elected 
board of shareholder and employee representatives from a list of ap-
proved candidates maintained by a public agency. The agency would 
have ultimate authority to approve or disapprove such elected persons as 
being suitably diverse and pertinent to the specific corporation’s opera-
tions.99 To be admitted to this list, candidates would have to satisfy the 
regulatory body that they not only had general directorial competence, 
but that they also appreciated the public role and democratic responsibili-
ties of corporations. 
By establishing such a balanced scheme of membership, certain 
important advantages will accrue. Apart from the general conformity of 
the proposal to a democratic vision of corporate governance, the most 
obvious benefits are twofold. First, even if individual directors take a 
very self-regarding stance by pushing only for the interests of those 
groups who elected them, they will still have to persuade others of the 
more general wisdom of that stance. It will likely require a more long-
term approach to directorial debate so that priorities and plans will be 
able to proceed on a more consensual basis. Also, being exposed to dif-
ferent perspectives might well loosen the more parochial concerns of 
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particular directors. Moreover, the active presence of the public directors 
will oblige other directors to develop and frame their views in ways that 
are more conducive to the promotion of the general public interest. 
Second, because the board of directors would be under a broad fiduciary 
duty to advance the interests of the whole corporation, the considerable 
challenge of balancing competing interests and objectives might be more 
easily accomplished. By having a more diverse and representative board, 
an appreciation of what is in the best interests of the corporation as a 
whole will be more informed and immediate: the various stakeholder 
communities will have a direct voice in discussions. This will also help 
to destabilize the ruling elite, which presently has a virtual lock on cor-
porate decision-making and culture. Accordingly, the odds on making 
the democratic wager are significantly shortened by the appointment of a 
more diverse and representative board of directors.100 
D. Substantive Measures 
Nevertheless, while such reforms in representation will be extreme-
ly important, they again will be insufficient in themselves to implement a 
democratic system of corporate governance. The introduction of more 
stakeholder-representative boards, greater responsibility for corporate 
actors and beneficiaries, and better protections for minority shareholders 
will be vitally important. But they will not be enough. If the goal is to 
ensure that large corporations act in a more democratic and responsive 
manner, it will also be essential to lay down certain minimum substantive 
standards against which corporate performance and behavior can be 
judged. Accordingly, there will need to be a mix-and-match balance be-
tween structural reform and substantive regulation. As traditional scho-
lars insist, it is naive to believe that asking present corporate officers to 
act responsibly for the benefit of stakeholder communities will be suffi-
cient or that making structural changes without some accompanying eth-
ical shift will achieve a marked degree of democratic modification.101 In 
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1256 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1219 
order for there to be genuine change and transformation in corporate be-
havior, it will be necessary for society as a whole to participate in the 
continuing responsibility of determining what is “in the public interest.” 
As public institutions, and government-created ones at that, corporations 
must at a minimum be obliged to ensure that they do not act in a way that 
is inimical to the public interest. As things presently stand, the public 
interest is too often a by-product of what happens to advance corporate 
and private interests at any given time and place. In a democracy, the 
public, through democratic institutions and processes, determines what 
the public interest is; the determination is not for corporations either by 
design or default to appropriate that task entirely for themselves. 
As well as improved transparency in corporate transactions and 
dealings, it would also be necessary to introduce mandatory disclosure 
and reporting on a whole range of economic and social issues that might 
include, for example, information on the products a company produces 
and the countries in which it does business; on the corporation’s law 
compliance structure; on its domestic labor practices; on its global labor 
practices and supplier/vendor standards; on its domestic and global envi-
ronmental effects; on corporate charitable contributions, political contri-
butions, or the effects of using a corporation’s products on consumer 
health and safety.102 But if corporate governance is to be taken seriously 
on its own terms, the enactment and enforcement of such regulations 
must not be left only to securities regulators. While the protection of 
shareholder interests is a necessary feature of any advanced economy, it 
is not and should not be the only game in town. Of course, it is not sur-
prising that the authorities persist in treating corporate governance as 
largely about the protection of shareholder interests alone when the in-
forming vision of corporate governance is so shareholder-centered in 
orientation, content, and enforcement. Accordingly, under a democratic 
model of corporate governance, it will be essential to create and empow-
er a public regulatory body whose exclusive responsibility is to deal 
squarely with corporate governance in its own right and not only as a 
function of the protection of shareholder interests. Because the size and 
power of large modern corporations has assumed such significance, it is 
clear that they warrant their own regulatory body. 
E. Democracy and Capitalism 
Finally, in offering this robust critique of contemporary approaches 
to corporate law and governance, it bears emphasizing that my intention 
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has not been to defend the claim that productivity or profit-making is a 
bad thing. Nor am I recommending that all jobs will be forever safe or 
that the workers’ and other stakeholders’ interests will always outweigh 
those of shareholders. This would be plain silly. There is nothing wrong 
with productivity, efficiency, profitability, etc. Indeed, they are essential 
values for any modern society to embrace and foster. But it is the eleva-
tion of such values to a cluster of meta-values against which all social 
processes and other values must be judged that is the problem. As both a 
matter of historical record and as an issue of public policy, it is mistaken 
to suggest shareholder value maximization is or ought to be the sole or 
primary goal of the business corporation. This would be, as an incredul-
ous critic notes, “to define the business corporation . . . as a kind of shark 
that lives off the community rather than as an important agency in the 
construction, maintenance, and transformation of our shared lives.”103 In 
particular, there is no sense in thinking about large corporations as a 
democratic venue for democratic engagement between political equals. 
While a cost-benefit analysis is necessary and desirable, it ought to be 
the first step in making any corporate decision, not the first, last, and on-
ly consideration. The process of formulating benefits and entitlements is 
important in itself under a democratic theory; an appreciation of the so-
cial context within which individuals exist and thrive is essential. 
There is simply no reason to be persuaded that capitalism and de-
mocracy are somehow synonymous.104 Indeed, the link between capital-
ism and democracy is weak at best and counterproductive at worst. If 
capitalism is to remain, then it must serve rather than master the interests 
of democracy. Citizens are entitled to basic economic protections by vir-
tue of their membership in society and not only through their efforts at 
contractual negotiations. Democrats appreciate that, while everything has 
a cost, it is not the sole measure of value: citizens are not only consum-
ers. And democracy is not only or best sold in the marketplace. Indeed, 
as Amy Chua has noted, “Markets concentrate wealth, often spectacular 
wealth, in the hands of the market-dominant minority, while democracy 
increases the political power of the impoverished majority.”105 The ob-
vious challenge is to ensure that politics is played out throughout social 
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life and not merely confined to areas outside the economic sphere; 
people are entitled to participation and accountability in their dealings 
with and inside businesses as much as with politicians and governments. 
Accordingly, a shift to more democratically structured corporations will 
likely galvanize the democratic instinct generally. As President  
Woodrow Wilson famously opined, “[T]he cure for the ills of democracy 
is more democracy, not less.” 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Recent events in corporate governance have at least opened up a 
space to think seriously about how it might be possible to turn the 
present system’s failings to transformative effect. Indeed, with effort and 
imagination, it might presently be possible to bring to an end the age of 
the corporation as a private-controlled agency for wealth accumulation. 
Uncoupled from “market capitalism” and hitched to a more democratic 
vision, the institution of the corporation can become a social, political, 
and economic organization in which public, political, and distributive 
ends are in play as well as private, economic, and productive ones. Berle 
and Means’s The Modern Corporation has a definite contribution to 
make to that project provided that its traditional reading is abandoned 
and its more enlightened alternative theme is emphasized: A shift must 
occur from “private property” to “democratic accountability” such that 
public policy is not only consistent with private cupidity. When large 
corporations are understood and analyzed in the larger setting of democ-
racy, it will be possible to move forward. By carrying out such a demo-
cratic stock-taking, it might then be possible to provide a more telling 
critique of corporate governance and to offer more constructive propos-
als for change. Indeed, it is only when corporations are obliged to be-
come part of, rather than remain apart from, democratic society more 
broadly that progress will be made. 
But the present conditions of decay and deterioration will only last 
for a short time. Any window of opportunity is already closing fast: the 
old habits and entrenched arrangements are beginning to reassert them-
selves. In the meantime, it is essential that those who take the democratic 
imperative seriously act quickly and decisively; the opportunity might 
not come again or soon. A belated seventy-fifth anniversary of Adolf A. 
Berle and Gardiner C. Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property could be celebrated in no more fitting or timely way than with 
such an initiative. Indeed, it might well be that, as goes corporate gover-
nance, so goes democracy. 
